Nordic and Baltic Online Gambling Markets: Regulatory Models, Taxation and Channelisation, 2026
Key Findings
• Regulatory models. The seven markets fall into three groups: a state monopoly (Norway), a monopoly in transition to licensing (Finland, from 1 July 2027) and licensing regimes with online tax rates of 28% of gross gaming revenue in Denmark, 22% in Sweden and Lithuania, 15% in Latvia and 5.5% in Estonia in 2026.
• Taxation is moving in different directions. Sweden raised its rate from 18% to 22% on 1 July 2024. Latvia raised its rate on interactive gambling from 12% to 15% on 1 January 2026, one year earlier than originally legislated. Estonia legislated a decline from 6% to 4.0% by 2029, while its government is debating further cuts and a parliamentary bill proposing 7% from 2027 was rejected. Lithuania has applied 22% since 2025 and, on 28 October 2026, its governing coalition agreed to raise gambling taxes from July 2027. Finland will apply 22% to licensed gambling from 1 July 2027.
• Channelisation. Sweden’s regulator estimates channelisation of the competitive market at 84% for 2025 (85% in 2024, 86% in 2023), within a range of 78%–89%. The channelisation figure cited by the Danish government, about 90%, is based on H2 Gambling Capital data. In Norway, foreign operators hold an estimated 13% of the total market and 31% of the product categories that compete with the state monopoly.
• Unlicensed supply. Sweden’s regulator had identified 2,186 websites without a Swedish licence by 30 April 2026. Norway’s regulator reviewed 661 websites in the past year, notified 306 and blocked 238 through DNS blocking, and applies a payment-brokering ban.
• Enforcement and supervision. Lithuania adopted payment blocking and a list of companies entitled to offer remote gambling, Latvia moved supervision from a dedicated inspectorate to its State Revenue Service on 1 April 2026, and Denmark’s National Audit Office reviewed the regulator’s action against illegal websites in 2025.
• Assessment: The published data do not show a simple relationship between the tax rate and channelisation: Denmark combines the highest rate with the highest channelisation figure cited by its government, although the indicators are produced by different methods. GCA assesses that predictability of tax and product rules and consistent measurement of channelisation are as important for market stability as the level of any single tax rate.
Main Analysis
1. Scope and Data Notes
This analysis covers four Nordic markets (Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland) and three Baltic markets (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). Iceland is not included. The data are taken from national regulators, ministries, parliaments and tax authorities, supplemented by reporting of the Estonian public broadcaster ERR and of the Baltic News Service where they report statements of officials; each figure is given with its period and source. The regulatory status is reviewed as of 11 November 2026.
Gross gambling revenue, net turnover, channelisation and market share are different measures and are not used interchangeably. The Swedish regulator’s “net turnover” (stakes minus winnings paid) corresponds to gross gaming revenue. The Swedish regulator defines channelisation as the share of turnover in the competitive market that takes place with licensed operators; the Danish figure refers to the share of online gambling with licensed providers; the Norwegian regulator reports the share of foreign operators in the total market and in competing categories.
2. Regulatory Models and Key Indicators
Market | Model and regulator | Online tax on gaming revenue | Channelisation or market-share indicator |
Denmark | Licensing; Danish Gambling Authority (Spillemyndigheden) | 28% of gross gaming revenue from betting and online casino (from 20% on 1 January 2021) | About 90% of online gambling with licensed providers (H2 Gambling Capital data, cited by the government in 2025) |
Sweden | Licensing since 2019; Swedish Gambling Authority (Spelinspektionen) | 22% of the gaming margin (from 18% on 1 July 2024) | 84% for 2025 (85% in 2024, 86% in 2023); range 78%–89% |
Norway | State monopoly: Norsk Tipping and Norsk Rikstoto; Norwegian Gaming and Foundation Authority (Lotteritilsynet) | Not applicable (monopoly) | Foreign operators: about 13% of the total market (12%–14%); about 31% of competing categories |
Finland | Veikkaus monopoly until 30 June 2027; licence applications accepted by the National Police Board since 1 March 2026; competitive operations from 1 July 2027 under the Finnish Supervisory Agency | 22% of gaming proceeds (lottery tax) from 1 July 2027 | No indicator identified; the reform aims to improve the channelisation rate |
Estonia | Licensing; Tax and Customs Board (EMTA) | 6% until 2025; 5.5% (2026); 5.0% (2027); 4.5% (2028); 4.0% (2029) under current law | No indicator identified |
Latvia | Licensing; State Revenue Service (SRS) since 1 April 2026, previously the Lotteries and Gambling Supervision Inspection (IAUI) | 15% of revenue from interactive gambling from 1 January 2026 (12% in 2024–2025, 10% before) | No official indicator identified |
Lithuania | Licensing; Gambling Supervision Authority (LPT) | 22% of gross income from 1 January 2025 (from 20%) | No official indicator identified |
3. Denmark
The Danish Tax Agency’s legal guide states that online casino gaming is taxed at 28% of gross gaming revenue (stakes minus winnings), under section 11(1) of the Gambling Duty Act. The Ministry of Taxation explained in a reply to the Folketing in the 2019–2020 session that the rate for betting and online casino rose from 20% to 28% from 1 January 2021. At that time the ministry cited an H2 Gambling Capital estimate of channelisation of about 85% in 2019 and assessed that the increase would lead to a shift to the unregulated market corresponding to a fall of about 9 percentage points in the long term.
In a letter to the state auditors in 2025 the Minister of Taxation stated that the latest statistics from H2 Gambling Capital show that 90% of gambling in Denmark takes place on websites with a licence, the eighth highest channelisation rate in Europe. A reply to the Folketing in the 2023–2024 session likewise reports channelisation, defined as the share of online gambling with licensed providers, on the basis of H2 Gambling Capital data. The Danish indicator is therefore a third-party estimate and is not produced by the same method as the Swedish regulator’s estimate.
The National Audit Office (Rigsrevisionen) reported in 2025 on the work of the Danish Gambling Authority against illegal gambling and on its supervision of licensed online providers. According to the report, the authority reviewed 1,326 gambling websites in 2021–2023 and found 425 that offered gambling illegally. In his reply, the Minister of Taxation stated that the authority had started processes to shorten processing times for illegal websites and to block access to more of them.
4. Sweden
In its report of 15 June 2026 the Swedish Gambling Authority estimated licensed net turnover (stakes minus winnings) at SEK 28.2 billion in 2025, of which the competitive part of the market accounted for SEK 18.7 billion. In 2024 around 99% of competitive-market turnover came from betting and commercial online gambling. Casino Cosmopol in Stockholm closed on 24 April 2025, and a decision of the Riksdag requires land-based casinos operated by Svenska Spel to close by 31 December 2025.
The authority estimated channelisation for the competitive market at 84% for 2025, compared with 85% for 2024 and 86% for 2023. Before the re-regulation of 2019 it was calculated to be significantly below 50%. The estimate is the average of two main indicators. A player survey conducted by Verian in February–March 2026 (6,744 respondents, of whom 4,175 had gambled in the previous 12 months) gives 89% for the competitive market, 98% for betting and 93% for online casino. An estimate of turnover based on internet traffic gives 78%, 95% and 68% respectively. The average is 84% overall, 96% for betting and 81% for online casino. The authority concludes that channelisation lies between 78% and 89% and proposes to continue to use the average as the indicator. It states that all measures are estimates, that the traffic method does not capture app visits (38% of licensed turnover comes from apps according to the authority’s survey of licence holders) and that it assumes equal turnover per visit on licensed and unlicensed sites.
The authority had identified 2,186 websites without a Swedish licence up to 30 April 2026, of which 334 belonged to companies subject to prohibition orders. By type, 976 offered online casino only, 800 offered online casino and betting, 113 offered skin betting and six offered betting only. Skin betting sites accounted for 42% of visits to unlicensed sites, online casino and betting for 35% and online casino for 21%. In the player survey the most common reasons for playing with unlicensed operators were self-exclusion through the Spelpaus.se register and perceived better chances of winning; the number of responses was 53, and the authority notes that small samples limit statistical reliability.
The Swedish gambling tax was raised from 18% to 22% of the gaming margin with effect from 1 July 2024, as stated by the Swedish Tax Agency and enacted on the basis of Government Bill 2023/24:74 and Tax Committee report 2023/24:SkU19. The Ministry of Finance’s memorandum estimated additional tax revenue of SEK 0.27 billion in 2024 and SEK 0.54 billion a year thereafter. Amounts for months before 1 July 2024 continue to be taxed at 18%.
5. Norway
Norway retains a state monopoly: Norsk Tipping offers lotteries, sports betting and casino games, and Norsk Rikstoto offers horse-race betting. According to the March 2026 report of the Norwegian Gaming and Foundation Authority, net turnover in the Norwegian gambling market in 2025 was NOK 12.7–12.8 billion, down 1% on 2024, with the largest decline in the private market. Norsk Tipping had close to 2,350,000 customers at the end of 2025, and its net turnover in games in direct competition with foreign operators was just over NOK 3.3 billion.
The authority estimates the market share of foreign operators at about 13% (12%–14%) of the total market. For the games in direct competition (sports betting, casino games and horse-race wagering) it estimates the share of foreign operators at about 31% (28%–34% in the body of the report, 28%–33% in its summary), Norsk Tipping’s share at 55% and Norsk Rikstoto’s at 14%. It estimates foreign operators’ net revenue from Norway at NOK 1.7–2.1 billion in 2025 (simplified to NOK 1.9 billion), against NOK 1.3 billion estimated for 2024; because the estimation method changed substantially, the authority states that it cannot conclude that the unregulated market is growing and that the two results are not comparable.
The authority’s quarterly survey (4,141 respondents) found that 2.6% of adults had gambled with foreign providers in 2025, compared with 3.8% in 2024; the half-yearly survey gave 4.4%. Among those who played casino games online, 10% said that they last played with a company other than Norsk Tipping. The number of registered players of Norsk Tipping’s casino brand KongKasino doubled from over 200,000 five years ago to 400,000 in 2025, with almost 50,000 new customers in the past year; Norsk Tipping states that 180,000 to 200,000 are active each month. First-time calls to the gambling helpline rose 44% in 2025, driven by online casino, and in 273 of 422 calls mainly about online casino only foreign operators were mentioned.
The authority lists the following measures against the unlicensed market: the prohibition on offering gambling without a licence, the payment-brokering ban, DNS blocking of websites, the marketing and television advertising bans, and dialogue with media and social platforms. In the past year it manually checked 661 websites, 306 received a notice of DNS blocking and 238 are currently blocked by decision; 72 adapted after receiving a letter or notice. It assesses the payment-brokering ban as probably the measure with the greatest effect on channelisation to date.
6. Finland
The Ministry of the Interior announced on 15 January 2026 that the exclusive right of Veikkaus Oy to organise gambling will end. The Government proposed that the President confirm the Gambling Act on 16 January; the Act enters into force mainly on 1 July 2027. After that date Veikkaus retains the exclusive right to lottery-type draw games, scratch cards, physical gaming machines and casino games. Applications for gambling licences have been accepted by the National Police Board since 1 March 2026, although licences cannot take effect before 1 July 2027. Until the end of June 2027 Veikkaus holds the exclusive right under the supervision of the National Police Board; from 1 July 2027 the licensing and supervision of gambling transfers to the Licensing and Supervision Agency, licensed gambling may begin on that date, and from 1 July 2028 licence holders may use only the software of holders of a game-software licence. After entry into force a consumer may set a gambling block through a centralised system covering the games of all licence holders. The stated aims of the Act are to prevent and reduce gambling harm and to improve the channelisation rate of the gambling system.
The Finnish Tax Administration states that, for gambling operators from 1 July 2027, the lottery tax is 22% of the proceeds (gaming margin) and that an operator needs a Finnish business identity code to file and pay it. Documents of the Ministry of the Interior to the Parliament’s Administration Committee in December 2025 show that the committee considered entry into force on 1 July 2027 and that the Act was approved by Parliament on 16 December 2025.
7. Estonia
Remote gambling is taxed on the operator’s net revenue under the Gambling Tax Act. The rate was 6% until 31 December 2025. An amendment bill had proposed 7% from 1 January 2027. In December 2025 the Riigikogu instead decided to reduce the rate in steps of 0.5 percentage points a year: 5.5% in 2026, 5% in 2027, 4.5% in 2028 and 4% from 2029, according to the amendment text and a letter of the Ministry of Finance. The explanatory memorandum of the amendment states that, before the reduction, remote gambling tax receipts were forecast in the state budget strategy 2025–2028 at EUR 21.871 million in 2025, EUR 26.779 million in 2026, EUR 28.064 million in 2027 and EUR 29.355 million in 2028.
A drafting error in the amendment provided a 2026 rate only for skill games and left games of chance offered as remote gambling without a rate. ERR reported that the Riigikogu adopted a corrected law in February 2026 and that the corrections took effect on 1 March 2026. According to ERR, the Ministry of Finance had assessed that the reduction would cut tax receipts by EUR 6 million in 2026, EUR 8 million in 2027, EUR 10 million in 2028 and EUR 13 million in 2029.
On 25 August 2026 the Prime Minister stated in an ERR interview that the government would debate the tax reduction in the budget talks, that there was so far a shortfall of several million euros instead of additional revenue, and that if the reduction brought no additional revenue there would be no further cuts. ERR reported in June 2026 that the tax change had so far not brought new online casino operators to the Estonian market. A separate bill (823 SE) proposing to raise the remote gambling tax rate to 7% from 2027 was rejected by the Riigikogu. The Ministry of Finance had opposed the proposal, stating that the circumstances behind the reduction had not changed since December 2025.
8. Latvia
The tax rate on interactive gambling was raised from 10% to 12% on 1 January 2024. A law published on 19 December 2024 provided that from 1 January 2027 the rate would be 15% of revenue from gambling organised through telecommunications. The 2026 budget package accelerated this: from 1 January 2026 the rate on interactive gambling is 15% of revenue instead of 12%, as summarised by the State Revenue Service (VID) after the law was adopted on 3 December 2025. In the government’s consultation, the industry association LLAB objected, arguing that the tax burden on interactive gambling would have risen by 50% in two years, from 10% to 15%, and asked to keep the 2027 date.
From 1 April 2026 the Lotteries and Gambling Supervision Inspection (IAUI) was integrated into the State Revenue Service, which took over all its functions in the gambling and lottery field. According to the State Revenue Service, in the first quarter of 2026 there were 20 gambling operators and the state-owned Latvijas Loto, with 18 online gambling licences, 6 land-based licences and 3 betting-point licences. Online gambling gross gaming revenue was EUR 44.100 million in the first quarter of 2026, compared with EUR 37.923 million in the first quarter of 2025 (116.2%): casino games EUR 37.743 million (117.2%), betting EUR 5.422 million (109.7%) and poker tournaments EUR 0.935 million (119.6%).
9. Lithuania
According to the Gambling Supervision Authority’s 2025 data, remote gambling companies reported gross gaming revenue (result from gambling activity) of EUR 202,379,791 in 2025, 18.6% more than the EUR 170,637,494 reported for 2024. Tax receipts from lotteries and gambling in 2025 were EUR 86,899,500, of which gambling organisers paid EUR 57,595,097 and large-lottery organisers EUR 29,304,403. Twelve companies organised gambling at 31 December 2025. A Government document based on the authority’s data states that total gross gaming revenue was EUR 241.8 million in 2024, so that remote gambling accounted for about 71% of it (GCA calculation).
The Ministry of Finance states that the tax on gross income from gambling, including remote gambling, was increased from 20% to 22% from 1 January 2025, and in 2025 it argued against an opposition proposal to raise rates further because the burden had been increased recently and operators faced other costs. The Ministry of Finance also reports that the Seimas approved measures against illegal remote gambling that block payments to unlicensed operators and require the authority to publish a list of companies entitled to organise remote gambling in Lithuania. On 28 October 2026, according to the Baltic News Service, the Prime Minister said that the governing coalition had agreed to raise taxes on gambling, lotteries and the sugar tax from July 2027 and expected additional revenue of EUR 100 million a year from the measures together; the rates had not been announced and the coalition council was to meet again on 11 November.
On 10 November 2026, Lithuania’s Ministry of Finance reported on proposed amendments to the Gambling Law submitted to Parliament, with input from the Gambling Supervision Authority. The proposals introduce a mandatory player card covering both online and land-based gambling, a transition to cashless payments at gambling venues, and expanded blocking measures targeting websites that promote or link to illegal gambling operators. The proposed player card would also facilitate centralised monitoring of player transactions and gambling limits. The Government proposes that the principal amendments take effect on 1 May 2027, with the player-card and cashless-payment requirements following on 1 January 2029. These measures remain legislative proposals and are not yet in force.
10. Cross-Market Comparison
Tax rates on online gambling moved in different directions in the period examined:
Market | Previous rate | Current or scheduled rate | Effective |
Denmark | 20% | 28% | 1 January 2021 |
Sweden | 18% | 22% | 1 July 2024 |
Lithuania | 20% | 22%; higher rates agreed in the governing coalition on 28 October 2026 (not yet announced) | 1 January 2025; increase from July 2027 |
Latvia | 10% (to 2023); 12% (2024–2025) | 15% on interactive gambling (15% had been legislated for 2027) | 1 January 2026 |
Estonia | 6% (to 2025) | 5.5% (2026); 5.0% (2027); 4.5% (2028); 4.0% (2029); bill 823 SE proposing 7% from 2027 was rejected | 1 January 2026 onwards |
Finland | Monopoly | 22% of gaming proceeds for licensed gambling | 1 July 2027 |
Channelisation indicators are not comparable between markets. Sweden’s estimate (84% for 2025) averages a player survey and a traffic-based estimate and is published with a range of 78%–89%. The Danish figure (about 90%) is based on H2 Gambling Capital data, cited by the Danish government. Norway reports the share of foreign operators, about 13% of the total market and about 31% of competing categories. The Baltic regulators and Finland did not publish a comparable indicator in the sources examined.
Within these limits, the data do not rank markets by tax rate. Denmark has the highest rate (28%) and the highest channelisation figure cited by its government; Sweden, at 22%, measured 84% with a range of 78%–89% depending on method; Norway, which has no licensing tax because of its monopoly, reports foreign operators at about 31% of the competing categories. The Danish Ministry of Taxation expected in 2019–2020 that the rise to 28% would reduce channelisation by about 9 percentage points in the long term, and Sweden’s player survey identifies self-exclusion and perceived winning chances as the most frequent reasons for playing with unlicensed operators; the sample of such respondents was small (53 responses).
11. Enforcement and Supervision Trends
Several markets rely on measures beyond licence conditions. Norway applies a payment-brokering ban and DNS blocking, which its regulator assesses as having the greatest effect on channelisation; Lithuania has adopted payment blocking and a list of companies entitled to offer remote gambling; Sweden’s regulator has issued prohibition orders against companies and has identified 2,186 unlicensed websites; Latvia moved supervision into its tax administration; and the Danish National Audit Office examined the Danish regulator’s action against illegal websites, which the Minister of Taxation said would be strengthened. Finland’s Act provides for a centralised gambling-block system covering all licence holders.
12. GCA Assessment: Predictability, Taxation and Channelisation
Assessment: The Nordic and Baltic markets show that channelisation results from several variables acting together: the tax rate, product and bonus rules, the interaction between self-exclusion and the licensed offer, the availability of enforcement tools and the competitiveness of the licensed product. The tax rate is one of these variables but not a sufficient explanation. This is consistent with GCA’s earlier published finding that regulatory restrictions on licensed operators without equivalent controls on illegal operators weaken the legal market.
Predictability. The Baltic markets illustrate the importance of predictable fiscal policy. Latvia legislated 15% for 2027 in December 2024 and applied it from 2026 after a budget decision a year later. In Estonia the rate path was legislated in December 2025, a drafting error left part of the 2026 base without a rate, and by August 2026 the government was questioning further cuts, while a parliamentary bill proposing a return to 7% from 2027 was subsequently rejected. In Lithuania the Ministry of Finance argued in 2025 that the burden had been raised recently, and in October 2026 the coalition agreed to raise taxes from July 2027. These changes do not by themselves show a loss of channelisation, but they increase uncertainty for operators that plan multi-year investments.
Measurement. Policy decisions on taxation and restrictions depend on the quality of the channelisation estimate. The Swedish regulator’s range of 78%–89% shows how much the conclusion depends on the method, and the Danish indicator rests on a third-party estimate. GCA assesses that regulators should publish methods, ranges and both money-based and player-based indicators, and should assess the effect of tax and product changes on these indicators before and after adoption.
Conclusions
• The region combines a monopoly (Norway), a monopoly in transition (Finland, from 1 July 2027) and five licensing regimes, with online tax rates from 28% in Denmark to 5.5% in Estonia in 2026.
• Sweden’s channelisation estimate has declined slowly (86%, 85% and 84% in 2023–2025) and remains below the 90% objective, with online casino the weakest segment. Sweden’s own estimate ranges from 78% to 89% depending on the method.
• The Danish channelisation figure of about 90% is based on H2 Gambling Capital data and the Norwegian regulator reports foreign operators at about 13% of the total market and about 31% of competing categories; the indicators are not comparable.
• Tax policy in the Baltics is unsettled: Latvia raised its rate a year earlier than legislated, Lithuania’s coalition agreed in October 2026 to raise gambling taxes from July 2027, and Estonia’s legislated reduction was questioned by the government, while a parliamentary proposal to restore 7% from 2027 was rejected.
• Enforcement is being extended through payment-related, blocking and supervisory measures (Norway, Lithuania, Latvia, Sweden), and Finland’s licensing system will include a centralised gambling-block system.
• The published indicators are not standardised: Sweden publishes a range, Denmark relies on a third-party estimate, Norway reports two denominators, and no comparable official indicator was identified for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland.
Sources and Basis
This review draws on official publications of regulators, ministries and tax authorities (the Swedish Gambling Authority, the Norwegian Gaming and Foundation Authority, the Danish Gambling Authority and Ministry of Taxation, the Finnish Ministry of the Interior and Tax Administration, the Latvian State Revenue Service, the Lithuanian Gambling Supervision Authority and Ministry of Finance, and the Estonian Ministry of Finance), national legislation and parliamentary documents (the Swedish Government Bill 2023/24:74 and Tax Committee report 2023/24:SkU19, the Danish Folketing’s ministerial replies, reports of the Danish National Audit Office, the Riigikogu’s amendment texts), reporting of the Estonian public broadcaster ERR and of the Baltic News Service on statements of officials, and GCA analysis and calculations.
Estimates of H2 Gambling Capital cited by the Danish government are third-party data and are attributed as such. Different sources report different figures for different dates and by different methodologies (for example, channelisation indicators); such differences are stated with their sources and are not reconciled. The report reflects information available through 11 November 2026.